Over-discounting, premium inflation – is it the brands or the authorized dealers? You decide after seeing the evidence.
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Originally published by The Watch Pit on Facebook (post). All analysis and commentary is attributable to The Watch Pit.
The gray market sits at the center of almost every frustration in luxury watch collecting today. Prices above retail for watches you cannot access at retail. Dealers who discount watches nobody wants while hoarding access to those everyone does. A pricing environment that seems designed to extract maximum value from buyers while offering minimum transparency. Somebody is responsible for this. The brands point at dealers. Dealers point at the secondary market. Everyone points at the flipper class. The Watch Pit examines the actual evidence.
The starting point for any honest analysis is this: luxury watch brands control their supply chains. They decide how many watches to make. They decide how to allocate those watches across their dealer networks. They set the retail prices. They determine the terms under which their dealers operate. Every structural feature of the market that drives gray market premiums — artificial scarcity, forced allocation imbalances, price increases that validate the investment narrative — flows from decisions made by brand management.
Rolex, Patek Philippe, and AP did not stumble into a situation where their sport watches trade at multiples of retail on the secondary market. They actively manage supply to ensure that demand consistently and substantially exceeds what the authorized channel can provide. This is not an accident. It is a strategy. And it generates gray market chaos as a direct consequence.
Consistent, above-inflation annual retail price increases — implemented by Rolex and several other brands for multiple consecutive years — are not neutral acts. They actively reinforce the narrative that luxury watches are appreciating assets rather than luxury goods. Every price increase headline confirms to buyers that these watches go up in value. That narrative is the single most powerful driver of speculative buying and flipping behavior.
Brands are not unaware of this dynamic. They benefit from it: gray market premiums signal extreme desirability, and that desirability gives commercial cover for further retail price increases. The cycle is self-reinforcing and entirely visible to brand management. Choosing to continue it is a choice.
ADs control who gets access to the units they receive. The allocation decision is made by the dealer, not the brand — though the brand constrains how many units there are to allocate. When an AD gives access to a Nautilus or Royal Oak to a client they know will immediately resell it, rather than to a client who wants to wear it, that is an AD decision with gray market consequences.
There is a documented history of ADs operating parallel gray market channels — maintaining their authorized status while also supplying the gray market with units that never touched a display case. In some markets, this has been sufficiently widespread to constitute a structural feature of local distribution rather than an isolated abuse. Brands are aware. Action has been inconsistent.
The same AD network that enforces absolute no-discount policies on sport references is simultaneously discounting dress watches, mid-range pieces, and accessories by 20–40% to move inventory. This is not a secret — any buyer with experience knows that negotiating with an AD on certain categories is standard practice.
The existence of deep discounting on a significant portion of an AD's inventory reveals that the scarcity and no-discount environment for sport references is not a natural market condition — it is deliberately managed. If the market were genuinely incapable of producing discounts, they would not exist anywhere in the product range. They exist precisely where brands cannot enforce the no-discount policy because demand is insufficient.
Both brands and ADs contribute to gray market chaos. But the power in this relationship is asymmetric. Brands determine supply, set terms, and could enforce consistent pricing policies if they genuinely wanted to. ADs are dependent on brand allocation for their business model and cannot afford to deviate significantly from brand preferences.
The gray market persists not because it is out of anyone's control, but because it is in nobody's immediate commercial interest to eliminate it. Brands benefit from the desirability signal. ADs benefit from the leverage their allocation access provides. The collector — the nominal customer of the entire system — bears all of the cost.
Thousands of discounted and unwanted Rolexes at just one gray dealer alone. Meanwhile, an authorized dealer is exposed by ex-employees to be 'flipping' super hot Rolexes at a premium to maximize profits. At the same time, your authorized dealers have very little say in the timing and selection of watches they get. So who is right and who is wrong?
Jomashop, one of the largest gray market watch retailers in the United States, lists thousands of Rolex watches for sale at any given time — at the time of our research, 3,498 Rolex watches were listed on a single page. These are brand new, unworn watches, many offered at 18% off retail. This is not a handful of stray pieces. This is a river of inventory flowing out of the authorized channel into the gray market, discounted heavily enough to signal that supply of these references substantially exceeds genuine consumer demand at retail.
A sample of discounted Rolex listings on Jomashop — all marked 18% OFF (prices in USD)
| Model | Reference | Jomashop Price |
|---|---|---|
| Day-Date 40 White Dial 18k Yellow Gold President | 228239WHTDSP | $65,795 |
| Day-Date 40 Champagne Dial 18k Rose Gold President | 228235BCMP | $65,795 |
| Day-Date 40 Silver Diagonal Motif 18k White Gold President | 228239BCMP | $65,795 |
| Day-Date 40 Silver Diagonal Motif 18k Yellow Gold President | 228238BCMP | $65,795 |
| Day-Date 40 Black Dial 18k Yellow Gold President | 228238BCKP | $60,795 |
| Day-Date 40 Champagne Dial 18k Yellow Gold President | 228239BCSP | $60,795 |
| Lady-Datejust Mother of Pearl Diamond Dial 18k Everose Gold | 279171NRD | $215,795 |
| Lady-Datejust Automatic Silver Dial Ladies | 279168 | $171,279 |
| Day-Date 36 Champagne Dial 18k Yellow Gold President | 128238BCSP | $37,925 |
| Lady-Datejust Grey Dial Automatic Platinum President | 279160GYRP | $37,720 |
| Lady-Datejust Mother of Pearl Automatic Platinum President | 279160MP | $39,560 |
| Lady-Datejust Pink Dial Automatic Platinum President | 279160PNSP | $37,720 |
Source: jomashop.com/rolex.html. Listings and prices as observed at time of research; inventory fluctuates.
Consider what this means. Rolex maintains that it does not authorize transshipment or wholesale of its watches, and that authorized dealers may sell only to end consumers over the counter. Yet nearly three and a half thousand brand new Rolex watches sit on a single gray market site, discounted 18%. These watches did not materialize from thin air. They flowed out of the authorized network — through one of the channels Rolex contractually prohibits. Either Rolex cannot control its own supply chain, or it does not choose to. Neither answer is flattering.
On the other side of the same coin, ex-employees of an authorized dealer have exposed their employer for 'flipping' super-hot Rolex references at a premium to maximize profits — selling the very watches that retail customers wait years for into the secondary market at inflated prices, rather than offering them to genuine buyers at retail. The same authorized network that tells you a Submariner or Daytona is 'allocated' or 'on a waitlist' is, in documented cases, feeding those watches straight into the gray market it publicly condemns.
So the gray market is fed from both ends: the unwanted inventory that ADs cannot sell at retail gets discounted onto the gray market, and the hot inventory that ADs could sell instantly at retail gets flipped onto the gray market at a premium instead. The only watches that consistently reach a genuine retail customer at retail price are the ones nobody particularly wants.
The defense that authorized dealers are independent businesses making their own choices collapses on contact with Rolex's own authorized dealer (ORJ) agreement. Extracted from a Rolex filing on file with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, the contract terms make clear that Rolex retains near-total control over what a dealer receives, when, and at what price — while the dealer carries all the commercial risk.
From the Rolex ORJ agreement, Orders section:
From the same agreement, the Retail Sales clause:
From section 7.2 of the agreement:
Read those clauses carefully. Rolex decides what a dealer orders, in what quantities, at Rolex's sole discretion (2.1). Rolex sets the price only when it ships, not when the dealer orders (2.2). Rolex can cancel any back order at its discretion and bears no liability for delays or cancellations (2.3). The dealer must stock whatever Rolex tells it to stock, year-round, or lose its authorization (7.2). And Rolex can walk in and inventory the dealer's stock and sales records on oral notice (7.2). The dealer has very little say in the timing and selection of the watches it receives — and bears the full commercial risk of whatever Rolex ships.
So when thousands of unwanted Rolexes pile up at a gray dealer at 18% off, and hot Rolexes are flipped by ADs at a premium, the question of who is right and who is wrong is not symmetrical. Rolex writes the rules, controls the supply, controls the allocation, controls the price, audits the inventory, and can cancel orders at will. The authorized dealer is, by contract, a compliant retail arm carrying Rolex's inventory risk. If the gray market is flooding with discounted Rolexes while the hot references are flipped for premiums, that is happening under a distribution system Rolex designed and controls — contractually, in writing.
A Chicago-based Rolex authorized dealer has been dragged into court by a former employee who is accusing the company of covering up a conspiracy to "illegally sell Rolex watches to foreign grey market resellers in order to enrich themselves." (WatchPro, February 16, 2021)
The case concerns C.D. Peacock (CDP), a multibrand jeweler with agencies for Rolex, Patek Philippe, Cartier, TAG Heuer and others across three stores in the Chicago area. CDP, its owner Seymour Holtzman, and four individuals, including Robert Baumgardner, who was CEO at the time of the allegations, are being sued by former employee Suzana Krajisnik. She was fired in December 2019 and says the termination was retaliation for whistleblowing and for refusing to take part in illegal activity. The case (No. 1:21-cv-00775) was filed on February 11, 2021 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, claiming violations of the Illinois Whistleblower Act, common law retaliatory discharge, and the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act. Those found guilty of racketeering can face fines of up to $25,000 and up to 20 years in prison.
Everything below comes from the plaintiff's court filing and press coverage of it. These are allegations only. None of the defendants had responded to them at the time WatchPro reported the story, nothing has been proven in court, and C.D. Peacock remained a Rolex and Patek Philippe authorized dealer according to its website at that time. Many of the accusations are based on private conversations between CDP staff, and it remained to be seen whether investigators would find concrete evidence to corroborate them.
According to the complaint, "the heart of the Scheme was a conspiracy by the Defendants to illegally sell Rolex watches to foreign grey market resellers in order to enrich themselves." To further it, the filing alleges the defendants conspired to violate numerous federal and state laws, including racketeering, money laundering, mail, wire, immigration and credit card fraud, and Illinois sales tax evasion. The plaintiff also alleges, on information and belief, that the scheme was replicated with several other luxury watch and jewelry brands, including Patek Philippe.
The complaint says the scheme began in late 2018 when a new salesperson with no prior jewelry experience, Yingxue Duan, was hired, and staff were told of a $10 million sales goal. According to the filing, if the goal was hit, Rolex would help pay for a remodel of the Old Orchard store, certain executives would earn substantial bonuses, and Rolex would make additional high-demand products available to CDP. The filing alleges that this target coincided with the acceleration of prohibited volume sales of Rolex watches out of the country.
Timeline of the alleged whistleblowing and firings (per the court filing)
| Date | Alleged Event |
|---|---|
| Late 2018 | Duan and Krajisnik hired; $10 million sales goal announced to staff |
| Dec 2018 | Assistant manager Olga Nelson allegedly stops Duan shipping an empty Rolex box out of state and reports it to store director Dyol Hill |
| Jan–Feb 2019 | Rolex Manager Giuseppe Di Lorenzo notices Rolex sales 'skyrocketing' in a slow period, driven by Duan; reports it to Hill, who allegedly takes no action |
| Mar 2019 | Krajisnik's hours allegedly cut from 40 to 23 per week and her Rolex access removed |
| May 4, 2019 | Nelson tells Hill and CEO Baumgardner she believes Duan is flipping watches; Baumgardner allegedly tells her to discuss it with no one |
| Jun 19, 2019 | Nelson fired; the filing says the pretext cited her saying Hill was 'in bed with' Duan |
| Jul 21, 2019 | Nelson emails owner Seymour Holtzman about the alleged scheme; the filing says he never responded |
| Oct 2019 | Hill leaves CDP under what the filing calls 'mysterious circumstances'; Christopher Croteau becomes store director |
| Nov 29, 2019 | Krajisnik reports what she knows to Croteau |
| Dec 2019 | Krajisnik fired, officially for poor sales; Di Lorenzo reports his concerns to Croteau |
| Dec 28, 2019 | Krajisnik emails Holtzman; the filing quotes his reply-all as asking who she is and who gave her his email address |
| Jan 6, 2020 | Di Lorenzo fired; the filing says the stated reason was sales to men with soon-to-expire driver's licences |
Source: Krajisnik v. C.D. Peacock, Inc. et al., No. 1:21-cv-00775 (N.D. Ill.), Complaint filed Feb 11, 2021. All items are allegations.
The filing explicitly draws the court's attention to the same Rolex Distribution Agreement published on the SEC website, noting that the agreement between CDP and Rolex is believed to be substantially similar. The clause the plaintiff relies on is the one quoted earlier: jewelers sell "only to ultimate consumers, at the retail level, in transactions that originate over-the-counter" and any transshipment of Rolex watches, "even if unintentional, is prohibited." The filing also describes how Rolex monitors dealers through a regional sales representative, 'secret shoppers', warranty-card copies and required certifications.
The filing itself says Rolex 'made a point of monitoring and limiting the amount of watches provided to its licensed retailers' and kept demand high for limited-supply watches by requiring that they be special ordered, 'solely for known and existing customers.' The Watch Pit asks the question the case raises regardless of its outcome: if watches that sell for double or more on the secondary market pass through dealer counters, where the dealer decides who gets them, how much of the gray market is fed from inside the authorized network, and who is accountable when it is?
For more on excessive discounting, excess stock, stock dumping and the dirtiest secret in the luxury watch industry, the gray market, see the other posts and articles on The Watch Pit's 'Rock Bottom Watch Prices from Around the World' page. Like or comment on our Facebook post to be individually notified when more information comes.
We are a horological counterculture investigative media company and have no commercial interests in the companies or sales discussed here. We are only here to expose the industry for what it truly is — and yes, we love (and will continue to love) watches too. The impact of excess supply and over-pricing are our core research subject areas, and we aim to expose the truth in the quest to uphold consumer rights and corporate accountability.
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