An investigation into the mysterious buyers snapping up limited watches before regular collectors can access them.
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Originally published by The Watch Pit on Facebook (post). All analysis and commentary is attributable to The Watch Pit.
You walk into an authorized Rolex dealer and ask politely for a Submariner. The answer: none in stock, waitlist closed, try again next year. Two days later that same reference appears on Chrono24 for double the retail price. Three dealers in your city, three identical conversations. So who exactly is walking out of those stores with the watches — and how?
In a previous investigation, The Watch Pit examined the delay in SUPPLY of Swiss luxury watch production. The findings were uncomfortable for the industry: retrenchment and poor retention of watchmakers due to low salaries, and the little-known fact that non-Swiss overseas parts and services can make up to 40% of any Swiss watch — with their shipment into Switzerland severely delayed by COVID lockdowns, port shutdowns, and other pandemic-related logistics issues.
But that supply-side analysis leaves a glaring question unanswered: why is the production of some popular watches delayed when each year production is so big that unpopular models are oversupplied? Is it because of recent, incredible, overwhelming demand? Or is it a lot more to do with profit and loss considerations in attracting and retaining watchmaking talent, and an over-reliance on parts and services from international suppliers despite the 'Swiss Made' brand promise?
Today we make another revelation — this time of the flipside: how is the DEMAND of these watches impacting you, and who are the PEOPLE you are competing against to acquire that Rolex or F.P. Journe, Royal Oak or Nautilus at retail price? The answer comes in two reasons.
The first reason you cannot get the watch you want is that brands do not treat all markets equally. They decide where to place their points of sale based on a combination of domestic market demand and expected inbound tourist spending. This directly impacts the ACCESS a consumer has to a product and to relationship-building with an authorized dealer or boutique.
Take a look at the points of sale across major countries and you will find striking discrepancies. Patek Philippe has only 2 points of sale in China and 1 in France, versus 7 in Hong Kong and 3 in South Korea, or 3 in Ireland but only 2 in the UAE. Rolex has over 100 points of sale in China (103), Germany (133), and the UK (103), versus 137 in Italy — despite Italy being economically near-stagnant for two decades — and 318 in the USA. These are not accidents. They are deliberate distribution decisions that determine how many collectors in each country can even begin a relationship with an authorized dealer.
Number of points of sale of five brands across 39 countries — the data behind the scarcity you experience.
| Country | IWC | JLC | Omega | Rolex | Patek |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| United States | 107 | 61 | 165 | 318 | 62 |
| United Kingdom | 46 | 29 | 124 | 103 | 38 |
| China | 124 | 89 | 110 | 103 | 2 |
| Germany | 83 | 58 | 110 | 133 | 32 |
| Italy | 68 | 2 | 81 | 137 | 32 |
| Japan | 61 | 36 | 78 | 64 | 30 |
| France | 28 | 1 | 68 | 60 | 1 |
| Switzerland | 51 | 15 | 54 | 34 | 21 |
| Spain | 17 | 7 | 49 | 42 | 16 |
| United Arab Emirates | 7 | 3 | 48 | 21 | 2 |
| South Korea | 34 | 4 | 36 | 12 | 3 |
| Saudi Arabia | 2 | 1 | 31 | 16 | 2 |
| Canada | 14 | 1 | 31 | 28 | 4 |
| Russia | 16 | 3 | 28 | 19 | 5 |
| Taiwan | 16 | 8 | 27 | 21 | 11 |
| India | 8 | 6 | 25 | 14 | Nil |
| Australia | 23 | 8 | 24 | 22 | 6 |
| Netherlands | 20 | 11 | 23 | 13 | 4 |
| Hong Kong | 26 | 18 | 20 | 43 | 7 |
| Austria | 16 | 7 | 18 | 14 | 5 |
| Mexico | 23 | 8 | 18 | 35 | 3 |
| Singapore | 16 | 6 | 17 | 19 | 9 |
| Belgium | 11 | 8 | 17 | 13 | 2 |
| Turkey | 8 | 1 | 16 | 15 | 1 |
| Portugal | 7 | 14 | 15 | 11 | 3 |
| Sweden | 5 | 3 | 12 | 7 | 2 |
| Poland | 4 | 2 | 12 | 10 | 1 |
| Norway | 3 | 1 | 11 | 6 | 1 |
| Thailand | 16 | 6 | 11 | 20 | 7 |
| Israel | 3 | 4 | 10 | 5 | 1 |
| Kuwait | 3 | 2 | 9 | 3 | 1 |
| Egypt | Nil | Nil | 9 | 3 | Nil |
| Denmark | 5 | 4 | 8 | 7 | 2 |
| Philippines | 5 | 4 | 7 | 10 | 2 |
| Greece | 8 | 6 | 7 | 33 | 2 |
| Finland | 2 | 3 | 6 | 3 | Nil |
| New Zealand | 5 | 2 | 6 | 6 | 2 |
| Indonesia | 4 | 5 | 6 | 10 | Nil |
| Ireland | 1 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 |
Read this table carefully and the pattern becomes clear. A collector in Ireland has exactly 3 Rolex points of sale and 3 Patek points of sale — the same Patek access as Hong Kong's 7 is more than double that. A collector in France, one of the world's largest luxury markets, has exactly 1 Patek Philippe point of sale and 1 Jaeger-LeCoultre point of sale. Meanwhile the United States has 318 Rolex points of sale and 62 Patek points of sale. Your geographic location is the first filter on whether you can even enter the allocation game.
The second reason is demographic, and it is growing more intense every year. Over 5 million new millionaires (persons with assets of at least USD 1 million) were created in 2020 alone, globally. No one needs to be close to being a millionaire to purchase a luxury watch priced at CHF 5,000–30,000. But the sheer number of millionaires and the wealth in the world is telling — and growing. It partly explains the FOMO (fear-of-missing-out) fever pitch around premium-loaded sports model references like the Nautilus, Royal Oak, and Rolex sport watches.
Every year, approximately 6 million Swiss mechanical watches are produced by the Swiss brands, with a fraction of that figure deemed 'luxury' — say, retailing at CHF 5,000 and above. Every year, watch newbies (typically around 27–30 years old) acquire their first luxury Swiss watch. Meanwhile, a large number of the age segment from 45 and upwards moves OUT of the watch-buying phase. Catching the coveted 30-to-45-year-old, 15-year-gap consumer segment is critical. What do they want, and what will it take to maximize sales and profit from this group?
How likely you are to rub shoulders with a millionaire in your city or country — the buyer pool you are competing against.
| Country | One in every... is a millionaire | Number of millionaires | Population (2020) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Switzerland | 8 | 1,034,918 | 8,654,622 |
| Australia | 14 | 1,804,644 | 25,499,884 |
| Hong Kong | 14 | 520,000 | 7,496,981 |
| United States | 15 | 21,951,202 | 331,002,651 |
| Netherlands | 16 | 1,039,239 | 17,134,872 |
| Sweden | 18 | 570,439 | 10,099,265 |
| Denmark | 19 | 306,823 | 5,792,202 |
| New Zealand | 21 | 225,487 | 4,822,233 |
| Singapore | 22 | 269,925 | 5,850,342 |
| Canada | 22 | 1,681,969 | 37,742,154 |
| Belgium | 23 | 514,859 | 11,589,623 |
| Austria | 26 | 346,172 | 9,006,398 |
| France | 26 | 2,468,939 | 65,273,511 |
| Ireland | 27 | 181,727 | 4,937,786 |
| United Kingdom | 27 | 2,490,952 | 67,886,011 |
| Germany | 28 | 2,952,710 | 83,783,942 |
| Norway | 31 | 176,630 | 5,421,241 |
| Japan | 35 | 3,662,407 | 126,476,461 |
| Taiwan | 39 | 608,997 | 23,816,775 |
| Spain | 41 | 1,146,911 | 46,754,778 |
| Italy | 41 | 1,479,830 | 60,461,826 |
| South Korea | 49 | 1,051,104 | 51,269,185 |
| Israel | 52 | 164,899 | 8,655,535 |
| Kuwait | 54 | 78,650 | 4,270,571 |
| United Arab Emirates | 58 | 169,113 | 9,890,402 |
| Finland | 65 | 85,114 | 5,540,720 |
| Portugal | 75 | 136,430 | 10,196,709 |
| Greece | 144 | 72,367 | 10,423,054 |
| Saudi Arabia | 168 | 207,000 | 34,813,871 |
| Poland | 254 | 149,120 | 37,846,611 |
| China | 273 | 5,279,467 | 1,439,323,776 |
| Mexico | 488 | 264,034 | 128,932,753 |
| Russia | 543 | 268,550 | 145,934,462 |
| Turkey | 730 | 115,473 | 84,339,067 |
| Thailand | 810 | 86,216 | 69,799,978 |
| Philippines | 1353 | 81,000 | 109,581,078 |
| Egypt | 1462 | 70,000 | 102,334,404 |
| Indonesia | 1593 | 171,740 | 273,523,615 |
| India | 1978 | 697,655 | 1,380,004,385 |
The implications of this table are profound. In Switzerland, one in every 8 people is a millionaire. In the United States, one in every 15 — a pool of nearly 22 million millionaires. Even in a country like China where only one in 273 is a millionaire, the absolute number exceeds 5.2 million. These are the people competing with you for the small fraction of 6 million annual Swiss mechanical watches that qualify as luxury. When you are told a waitlist is 'full,' this is the demographic reality behind that statement.
It is to this group of newly acquired wealth that marketing is targeted. It is to this group of newcomers to watch buying that advertising narratives are created. Heavy advertising is deployed to initiate the very first 'Wow!' on first sight of beautiful products in carefully crafted advertisements. The brands know exactly who they are courting — and they spend accordingly.
In the U.S. market alone, 71 watch brands spent over USD 1 million on advertising in a single recent year. The top spenders reveal where the marketing firepower is concentrated: Rolex led with USD 56.38 million, followed by Breitling at USD 45.11 million, Omega at USD 34.49 million, Cartier at USD 25.45 million, and Chanel at USD 20.89 million. Rounding out the top tier were Movado (USD 19.69 million), Longines (USD 17.81 million), TAG Heuer (USD 15.36 million), Seiko (USD 14.94 million), Tudor (USD 12.02 million), and Breguet (USD 10.02 million).
The pattern is unmistakable. The brands that spend the most on advertising are, with few exceptions, the brands whose sport references trade at the highest gray market premiums. The advertising does not merely inform — it manufactures the desire that the allocation system then converts into scarcity. Every dollar spent on advertising a watch that cannot be obtained at retail reinforces the perception that the watch is worth more than its retail price.
Every day, the watch-appreciating community makes its views known online. These comments are estimated to number in the low thousands daily, across web forums, Facebook groups and pages, and responses to watch blogging articles and reviews. The commentary often centers on three recurring themes: the similarity of trends across different brands ('that's a Royal Oak homage,' 'this year everyone is producing brown dial watches'); the lack of innovation within a brand or group of brands (the same watch line in a similar case and movement, but with a different dial color or just a different case size); and the incongruity between the 'real worth' of a watch — say, the A. Lange & Söhne Datograph — versus the Platinum Rolex Daytona on bracelet, the latter of which is almost the same value as the former, much to the chagrin of watch appreciators.
Are there only haters when new watches are launched? It would seem so from online comments. But the enquiries and subsequent sales by a watch brand often construct a very different narrative — the narrative upon which the brand bases its marketing backbone. The lesson here is critical: the silent majority still buys hungrily, particularly at entry-level price points and basic models, and particularly among newcomers to watch buying. Even with under-performing brands, the average watch sale price remains that of a basic three-hander model. The vocal online minority and the purchasing majority are not the same group, and brands know this.
A deeper dive into the Morgan Stanley / LuxeConsult report on the luxury watch industry reveals a category of brands whose situation is the inverse of Rolex and Patek Philippe: high-value, low-production brands where the average price of what is actually sold falls far below what is marketed and what people know. These brands are not having a great time — annual production is low AND the average price of a sold watch is far, far less than the heavily marketed impressions left on potential buyers' minds.
These brands carry high average selling prices that sit well below the public 'perception' of their price point, and they are not selling in volume: Piaget (CHF 20,528 average, ~15k pcs/year), Van Cleef & Arpels (CHF 34,837, ~6.5k pcs/year), Roger Dubuis (CHF 17,200, ~5k pcs/year), Franck Muller (CHF 13,378, ~18k pcs/year), and Harry Winston (CHF 17,782, ~6.5k pcs/year).
This is the other side of the scarcity coin. The brands whose sport watches you cannot get at retail are the mirror image of brands whose headline pieces you rarely see on wrists — not because they are scarce, but because very few are actually sold, and what is sold is the entry-level three-hander rather than the complicated showpiece the marketing promotes. When you understand both sides, the industry's pricing and distribution logic becomes legible: scarcity is manufactured where it serves the brand, and marketing fills the gap where the product does not sell through on its own merits.
Reason Number ONE: You can't get to them where you live. Not all cities and countries are valued in the same way by each brand, and products are allocated accordingly. If your country has one Patek Philippe point of sale and the next has seven, you are not competing on a level field — you are competing on a field the brand has already tilted away from you before you ever walk through a door.
Reason Number TWO: There is simply too much wealth, too many well-heeled buyers, with more newly-minted millionaires produced every year than ever before, all competing for products they fear missing out on. In this race, the majority simply will not get the tiny number of sought-after products so strongly lusted after. The math is unforgiving: millions of millionaires, a few hundred thousand luxury watches, and an allocation system that prioritizes purchase history over enthusiasm.
What options do you have then? In our opinion, there are many, many gems in the secondary used market that are severely underappreciated and underpriced. Shake off the novelty gleam of 'getting brand new from the retailer because it also bestows onto me a special privilege and recognition of how special I am' and enter the secondary market of timepieces made before, and you will be a far happier watch buyer. The watches are the same. The experience of acquiring them can be yours rather than a privilege extracted from you.
Luxury watch brands do not sell to the public — they sell to their authorized dealer networks, which then sell to consumers. This means every popular watch must pass through an AD before it reaches a collector, and ADs receive fixed allocations set by the brand. Those allocations are not transparently published. They are set behind closed doors based on each dealer's historical sales volume, their market tier, and their relationship with the brand's regional team.
Here is the critical point: the allocation of a given reference — say, the Rolex Submariner 124060 — to a specific dealer may be two or three units per year. Two or three units. For a dealer with a waitlist of forty names. This scarcity is not random. It is the product of deliberate brand decisions about how many units to make, how many to allocate per market, and how to distribute them across their dealer network.
Authorized dealers are private businesses, and they are under no obligation to sell to you just because you walked in and asked nicely. The unwritten — and increasingly not-so-unwritten — rule of the luxury watch AD network is this: access to desirable references is a reward for demonstrated purchase history.
In practice, this means the collector who has spent tens of thousands with a dealer over multiple years buying jewelry, less sought-after watches, leather goods, and accessories has built up the kind of relationship that gets them a call when something desirable arrives. The first-time buyer who wants a Daytona and nothing else has essentially no legitimate path to retail allocation.
This system benefits ADs commercially. It forces customers to buy across the full catalogue — including slow-moving inventory — to maintain their status. It creates captive, high-value repeat customers. And it gives the AD plausible deniability when accused of unfair allocation: 'We prioritize our best customers.' What's unfair about that?
A distinct and growing category of buyer has recognised that access to popular watches at retail is one of the most reliable arbitrage opportunities available. These individuals — sometimes operating alone, sometimes as coordinated small teams — systematically cultivate relationships with ADs across multiple cities and countries.
Their approach is methodical. They invest real money across a dealer's full catalogue over months or years, building purchase history. They are not collectors. They have no emotional attachment to the watches they buy. Their only interest is in accumulating access to the watches that trade above retail on the secondary market, which they then sell immediately.
At scale, this behavior crowds out genuine collectors entirely. Every Nautilus sold to a systematic flipper is a Nautilus that did not go to someone who wanted to wear it. The brands are aware this happens. Some claim to have anti-flip policies. The enforcement of those policies is, charitably, inconsistent.
The most uncomfortable part of any honest investigation into watch availability is what happens inside the dealer network itself. Multiple documented cases and widespread industry knowledge confirm that a meaningful percentage of gray market supply originates not from external flippers gaming the system, but from within the authorized dealer network.
This takes several forms. Staff at ADs may receive watches at employee prices and resell them. Management may direct units to relationships outside the normal customer hierarchy. In some cases, ADs themselves have been documented running parallel sales channels — essentially operating as gray market dealers while maintaining their authorized status. Brands are aware. Enforcement varies dramatically.
The honest conclusion is not comfortable but it is important: for the most desirable references from the top brands, the retail price is essentially a fiction for most buyers. You cannot access that price. The real market price is the gray market price, and the premium you see on Chrono24 or Watchfinder is the actual cost of that watch for someone without multi-year AD relationships or specialist knowledge of the system.
This is not a bug. The system functions exactly as the brands intend. Scarcity at retail drives gray market premiums. Gray market premiums validate the brand's desirability and provide justification for retail price increases. The collector who cannot get the watch at retail ends up either paying the premium, being excluded from ownership entirely, or spending years cultivating AD relationships that the average person simply does not have time or money to develop.
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